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Oratie 
 
Uitgesproken ter gelegenheid van de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder 
hoogleraar ‘Administrative Governance in the EU’ aan de Faculteit der 
Cultuur- en Maatschappijwetenschappen van de Universiteit Maastricht 
 
Op vrijdag 2 oktober 2009 
 
 
Door 
 
 
Dr. Sophie M.R.L .Vanhoonacker 
 
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, 
Geachte toehoorders, 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘EU restrictions on the size of 26 types of fruit and vegetables are lifted today, ending the 20-
year absence of lumpy melons and suggestively shaped aubergines from supermarket shelves. 
Houray!’ – The Guardian, 1 July 2009. 
 
Earlier this summer, the European Commission made headlines in the international press, not 
because it was launching yet another new piece of legislation but because it was actually 
withdrawing one. In particular, it announced it was scrapping a long-standing directive laying 
down rules on the size and shape of cucumbers and 25 other types of vegetable and fruit. The 
so-called ‘straight cucumber legislation’, that’s to say, the rule that cucumbers classified as 
being ‘Class One’ cannot bend more than 10mm for every 10 mm of their length – I am quite 
serious -  has often been ridiculed and quoted by a euro-sceptic media, as a typical illustration 
of how the EU bureaucracy gets excessively fixated on regulation. Interestingly enough, 
pressure to abolish the rules did not come from farmers unions or even the fruit and vegetable 
industry – in fact they considered the quality standards as a helpful instrument in their search 
for new markets. It just so happens that the abolishment of the directive was an initiative of 
the so-called ‘Anti-Bureaucracy Group’ in the European Commission. It was intended as a 
political message to demonstrate to the broader European public that it was serious about its 
commitment to reduce red tape.  
 
Apart from your own obvious relief that curved cucumbers and knobbly carrots will 
no longer be wasted and can be used in your daily soup, the cucumber story - in whatever 
form you prefer it, straight or curved - is also insightful for several rather serious reasons. 
Firstly, it is an illustration of how international and European legislation is having an impact 
on almost every aspect of the lives of ordinary citizens. In an increasingly globalising world, 
standards are no longer set at the national level but negotiated in international or regional fora 
such as the United Nations or the European Union.1 Many of today’s challenges – be it 
tackling climate change or coping with swine flu – require responses far beyond the capacities 
                                                 
1 The above- mentioned EU standards for fruit and vegetables were de facto to a large extent based on pre-
existing rules set by the UN Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva. 
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of national governments. Since the end of the Second World War, a whole range of 
international and regional organisations ranging from the UN to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the European Union have been established. All these institutional 
actors are supported by their own bureaucracies. In addition, national civil servants travelling 
to New York, Geneva, Paris, or Brussels also spend a lot of their time in these fora. 
A second lesson which the cucumber case teaches us is that the broader public is well 
aware of this penetration of the international and European political level into their daily lives. 
However, while ordinary citizens may well understand that in today’s complex world this 
‘intrusion’ is unavoidable, the irritation about straight cucumbers is illustrative of a broader 
frustration with decisions taken far from the public eye, and which are difficult to contest. 
 
2. Administrative Governance 
 
It is precisely international bureaucracies, and specifically the supranational administration of 
the EU as one of the most advanced and powerful international civil services, that are the 
subject of my special chair as well as of the research programme Administrative Governance, 
currently formulated at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. The term ‘Administrative 
Governance’ may not sound very exciting (at first instance, it might even strike you as boring) 
but it does accurately reflect the research focus of my chair on the role and impact of 
international administrative actors and units in multi-layered systems of decision-making. 
And I can assure you, it is an extremely stimulating area of academic research, particularly 
given the fascination institutions hold for political scientists. 
 The motives for choosing to focus on international bureaucracies are plentiful. Firstly, 
it presents us with interesting challenges from a conceptual and theoretical point of view. The 
German sociologist Max Weber, who was one of the first and most influential thinkers about 
public administration and who developed an ideal model of bureaucracy, developed his 
concept within the context of a hierarchically-organised government. The question however 
remains to which extent the ideal type of the top-down Weberian state is still relevant as a 
comparative standard for today’s political and administrative realities. A supranational polity 
such as the EU or an international bureaucracy such as the World Trade Organisation does not 
have a single centre. Decisions are taken through a process of intense consultation and 
negotiation among politicians, civil servants, the private sector and civil society. Although 
relations of hierarchy may still play a role, there is an important place for policy networks, 
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forcing us to think beyond Weber and requiring new concepts and updated theoretical models 
in order to conceptualise bureaucracies.  
Besides the conceptual and theoretical challenges, we also face a serious gap in terms 
of empirical fieldwork. Public administration and organisation studies are dominated by case 
studies on the national and local level, while the number of systematic studies of international 
bureaucracies is still limited. This lacuna is quite surprising given the increasing role of 
international organisations, but it may stem from the fact that the administrative level is less 
visible than the political level. As Derk-Jan Eppink (2007), a former staff member of the 
cabinet of Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein, rather succinctly put it, ‘The politician wants to 
read his name in the newspaper every day; the mandarin … just twice: when he is born and 
when he dies’. 
Thirdly, the growing importance of international administrations also gives rise to 
normative questions about the democratic quality of public policies. If indeed it appears that 
international non-elected civil servants do exert an important influence on the choices made 
by politicians, this brings new challenges and concerns in terms of legitimacy and public 
accountability. 
 Last but not least, our choice has also been reinforced by some internal motives. As a 
centre of expertise in European Studies, our faculty has considerable know-how on the 
process of European integration and its underlying institutional and administrative structures. 
In addition, we have an increasing number of colleagues with a focus on questions of global 
governance. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary cocktail of philosophers, historians, political 
scientists, IR scholars and colleagues with a background in public administration should allow 
us to come up with creative answers to questions we feel need urgently to be addressed And 
we by no means ignore our colleagues from the Law Faculty; the emerging multi-level 
administrative order also raises important new questions for scholars in European and 
international public law. 
I now propose to further elaborate upon the faculty’s Administrative Governance 
programme. Thereafter, I will give you a taster of my own research, which deals with a 
particular category of civil servants, namely the national- and Brussels-based diplomats 
dealing with European foreign policy. 
 
3. The Administrative Governance Research Programme 
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Taking into account the vast scope of the Administrative Governance theme and the fact that 
we are venturing into relatively unexplored territory, we (Prof. Tannelie Blom, Prof. Thomas 
Christiansen, Dr Nico Randeraad and myself) have opted to build our research on three main 
pillars: 
 
3.1 History Matters 
Firstly our programme includes a strong historical perspective. Although the rise of an 
international administration is a relatively recent phenomenon and EU history is still young, it 
is important to embed our work in the longer tradition of scholarly work on public 
administrations and administrative history. Hereby we are not just interested in the 
development of an EU civil service over time, but also in the paths that national 
administrations have followed as they developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. In other words, 
we start from the assumption that international bureaucracies do not develop in a vacuum but 
rather that they have strong roots in the national traditions of their constituent member states. 
The hierarchical structure of the European Commission as it developed from the 1950s for 
example, cannot be understood without a good knowledge of French administrative history; 
nor can we grasp the British irritation with the way the Brussels civil service has become 
politicized without being aware of its long tradition of, and emphasis on, the neutrality of the 
administration. 
 
3.2. The Role of Bureaucratic Information and Expertise 
Leaving history aside, a second key theme in our research is that of the role of bureaucratic 
information and expertise as a key source of influence in multi-layered systems of decision-
making. 
The traditional view of bureaucracies is a functional one. The choice for professionally 
trained civil servants with life-long contracts was, in the first instance, meant to support 
governments in their daily work. For early thinkers about administrative organisations such as 
Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson (the later US president), there was a clear distinction 
between the political and the administrative level. In 1887, Wilson noted that administration 
‘lies outside the proper sphere of politics’ and that ‘administrative questions are not political 
questions’. We all know, however, that this dichotomy is artificial. The administrative branch 
is more than just a neutral secretariat keeping the machinery running. 
In the current literature, it is generally recognised that even if officials have no formal 
decision-making competencies, they play an important role in the policy-making process. The 
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principal devices they have at their disposal are time, size, mobilisation of interests, and, last 
but not least, information and expertise. Firstly, officials have time: not in the satirical 
meaning that they are slow (some even claim lazy), but in the sense that they generally have 
permanent contracts  - they are ‘career civil servants’ - and therefore will be around much 
longer than their elected political superiors. If they don’t agree with certain developments, 
formally they cannot stop them but they can - within certain limits - resort to delaying tactics 
such as holding up information, delaying the provision of documents etc. 
Secondly, there is their size. And size matters. In the current European Commission 
for instance, there are 27 Commissioners and approximately 32,000 civil servants. Every 
Commissioner has under his or her authority several hundred officials, often based in different 
Directorates-General. As such, you might well appreciate that it is difficult, if not impossible 
to get a full grip on the activities of such a vast group of people. Now many of you in this 
audience may be of the opinion that these numbers should be drastically reduced. But 
administrative organisations will always largely outnumber the political branch of 
government, making any attempt to exert control a challenging task. That politicians 
sometimes have the feeling that they are losing control over their administrative agents is well 
illustrated by the outcry of a frustrated Commissioner Verheugen warning his colleagues that 
‘The Commissioners have to take extreme care that important questions are decided in their 
weekly meeting and not decided by the civil servants among themselves’.  
A further important resource of bureaucratic institutions is the mobilisation of support 
for their preferred solution. More than ever, administrations closely interact with pressure 
groups and civil society. Lobbying is not just a one-way process whereby interest groups try 
to get access to the public policy-making process – the flip-side is that the bureaucracy can 
use these groups in the agenda-setting process or to advance certain political approaches over 
others. 
Last but not least, there is the resource of information and expertise. It is precisely this 
fourth category, generally accepted as the principal source of influence of the administration, 
which we want to investigate further and therefore have as the main focus of our attention. It 
is impossible for politicians, be it ministers or parliamentarians, to be experts in every subject. 
Moreover, it is often the case that a minister leads a department in an area were he or she has 
hardly any previous experience. The Belgians in the audience may remember the recent 
commotion in the Flemish and even Dutch press about the newly appointed Flemish minister 
of culture Joke Schauvlieghe. She was accused of never reading books, and when it appeared 
that her last theatre play was a piece by the local amateur dramatics company in her village, 
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Evergem, she was denounced as a philistine, and her cultural erudition compared to the 
thickness of a surfing board. Although this may be an extreme example, it is indeed the case 
that politicians, despite their own views, educational background and priorities, are highly 
dependent on their administrative staff.  
Singling out information and expertise as a key resource for administrations, we have 
identified two main questions that we want to investigate further. Firstly, the question of how 
and under which conditions international administrations such as the WTO secretariat or the 
European Commission manage to translate their informational advantage into influence. In 
other words, to what extent does their expertise allow them to make a difference? The 
assumption is that civil servants are not merely neutral but that they may have their own 
interests and opinions on the preferred solutions to societal problems. Secondly, we are also 
interested in what is called ‘the politics of information’. This is the process whereby 
information is standardised and institutionalised. If, for instance, the European Commission 
and the EU Statistical Office Eurostat develop indicators to monitor member state progress on 
sustainable development, we want to know how they arrived at these statistical indicators and 
what the underlying political interests were. 
 
3.3. International Public Administrations: Public Control and Accountability 
So, history is important, and information and expertise may be key, but that is by no means 
the whole picture. What about values? What role do they place in the administrative branch? 
This brings me to the third main theme of our Administrative Governance research 
programme which is the normative question of public control and the accountability of civil 
servants. If it is indeed the case that civil servants play an important policy-making role, how 
can we prevent what Weber has termed a ‘Beamtenherrschaft’ or the dominance of the 
political system by the bureaucracy? In the traditional Westphalian state, the parliament 
closely scrutinizes the acts of government, and ministers carry the ultimate responsibility for 
the actions of their administration. But to whom are international civil servants explaining and 
justifying their conduct and who takes responsibility in case of failure? How can 
accountability be achieved in a system like the EU with multiple centres of decision-making 
and where there is only a very weak link between public elections and the political output? 
The emergence of a multi-level system of governance forces us to rethink traditional 
mechanisms of accountability, including those of bureaucratic accountability.  
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4. Foreign policy bureaucracies 
 
Now that you have a general idea of our Administrative Governance Research agenda, I will 
talk about my own research and how it contributes to the programme. As I mentioned at the 
beginning, my own research has focused so far, and will continue to focus in the near future, 
on the diplomatic bureaucracies underpinning the European foreign policy process. By this I 
mean, not only the diplomats based in the different national ministries of foreign affairs, but 
increasingly also, the emerging European-level diplomacy, made up of foreign policy civil 
servants and diplomats based in Brussels. The European Union is a very interesting case: it 
represents one of the most advanced – and complex – forms of foreign policy cooperation 
ever, and since 1989 that cooperation has gained extra momentum. 
 
4.1. The EU as a foreign policy actor 
If you visit the website of the Council of the European Union, you will see how the EU is 
reacting to international events all over the world on a daily basis. You will find a declaration 
congratulating the Afghan people with their recent elections, a condemnation of the 
unjustified trial of the Burmese Nobel Peace winner Suu Kyi. But words are cheap you might 
think. There is also concerted action: you will learn that there is an EU arms embargo against 
Iraq, discover that the EU is engaged in a military operation called Atalanta trying to protect 
vessels against pirates off the Somali coast, and see that it is present in Kosovo with 1800 
international police officers, judges, and customs officials assisting in the delicate process of 
state building. As a matter of fact, since 2003, the EU has engaged in more than 20 small- and 
medium-scale civilian and military operations. 
While the adoption of joint foreign policy declarations already has a long tradition, the 
EU’s role in crisis management (such as the various operations in the Balkans) only started in 
2003. This rather recent operational role has everything to do with the sensitive character of 
foreign policy cooperation. In the early years of European integration the Member States of 
the European Communities concentrated on reducing trade barriers and it was only from the 
early 1970s onwards that they started to coordinate positions on foreign policy issues such as 
the Middle East or the East-West dialogue. 
The rules of the game were, however, quite different from those on economic 
integration, an area where the supranational European Commission had the exclusive right of 
initiative. In the sensitive field of foreign policy, it was the six-monthly rotating Presidency, 
where member states take turns at the helm of the European Union, which played the central 
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role leaving the Commission to some extent side-lined, only being consulted when there was 
an overlap with trade issues. The Member States, which wanted as far as possible to keep 
everything in their own hands, behaved as real control freaks or gate-keepers. It was not until 
the late 1980s that a small secretarial unit was established in Brussels, not in the European 
Commission but on the premises of the Council Secretariat, under the watchful eye of the 
Member States. 
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis barely two 
years later made Europe’s political leaders realise that a declaratory policy, that’s to say a 
policy of ‘all mouth but no trousers’ was not enough to address the challenges of the post-cold 
war period. And so, it was here in Maastricht in December 1991 that they committed 
themselves to the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP. I admit 
that CFSP is a terrible acronym. In fact, in his memoirs, the former Commissioner of External 
Relations Chris Patten recounts how, when he was returning to the UK after having worked 
for five years on CFSP, people told him: ‘ The C-What? Didn’t you used to be Chris Patten?’  
But after Maastricht, it would still take another Treaty – the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty - 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to really start to take shape. An important 
breakthrough had come in December 1998, when the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
meeting with French President Jacques Chirac in Saint Malo, agreed that the EU should have 
the ‘capacity for autonomous action’ (i.e. independently of the US), ‘backed up by credible 
defence forces’. This does not mean that the EU now suddenly had the ambition to become a 
military superpower, but rather that it was - you might say, at last - ready to support its 
declarations with operational actions such as peace-keeping and peace-making tasks, waving 
a European flag rather than a whole set of national flags. 
These new ambitions raised challenges not only in terms of human and material 
capabilities (there is no European army or police force), but also as regards the governance of 
CFSP. The earlier practice of running everything from the national capitals was incompatible 
with the desire to bring about a more operational foreign policy, and create new and more 
permanent Brussels-based structures able to react promptly to international developments. At 
the political level, the most important development was the appointment of the Spaniard, 
Javier Solana, as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Solana was not based in the supranational European Commission but in the Council 
Secretariat, the supporting body of the Member States. This is not surprising since his main 
task was to assist the rotating Presidency, i.e. the Member States. Despite the Treaty’s 
minimalist job description - he was supposed to be merely an assistant - Solana has been 
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arguably very proficient in his ability to fill the position. In short, he has become Europe’s de 
facto foreign policy minister. 
The appearance of Solana on the EU foreign policy stage and the perceived need for a 
more efficient and effective decision-making process has had an important impact on the 
administrative structures supporting European foreign policy. Solana soon received the 
assistance of a policy unit. From 2000 the decisions of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were 
prepared by a new Political and Security Committee at ambassadorial level, and meetings of 
the representatives of the chiefs of defence began to deal with military matters. These are just 
a few examples of the multiple bodies that have mushroomed in recent years. They illustrate 
well how even one of the most anxiously guarded European policy areas has not been able to 
resist the centripetal forces of Brussels. And the story does not end here. If today a majority of 
Irish citizens vote ‘yes’ (which we will know tonight or tomorrow), we will take another step 
in the direction of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which will bring further institutional 
changes. The new Treaty provides that the monthly meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
will no longer be chaired by the rotating Presidency but by Solana’s successor, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It would have been 
simpler to call him the ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ but as we know the EU is highly 
skilled at not calling things by their name.2 Solana’s successor, who will also be a Vice 
President of the European Commission, will be formally in charge of giving guidance to 
European foreign policy and representing the Union in relations with third countries and 
international organisations. He will receive his own administration, the so-called European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and he will also be responsible for the Union delegations, or 
what one might think of as the ‘EU embassies’ in third countries. 
 
4.2. Understanding the Emerging EU-Level Diplomacy 
It is clear that for EU foreign policy and diplomacy aficionados like several of my colleagues 
and myself, the new developments give rise to many fascinating questions directly related to 
the Administrative Governance Research agenda which I presented earlier. The three foci of 
the programme -the historical lenses;  information and expertise as a key source of 
bureaucratic influence; and the normative question of accountability -, provide us with 
interesting angles from which to study the emerging EU-level diplomacy in more detail. 
                                                 
2 The term Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was originally used in the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe’ but after the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes, it was changed into the ‘High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’. The change was mainly an act of window-dressing since the functions were 
not changed. 
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Rather than presenting a long shopping list, I will give a couple of examples of questions that 
my CFSP colleagues and I are in the process of researching, or hope to embark upon 
investigating in the near future. 
Admittedly, European foreign policy cooperation is still young and EU-level 
diplomacy is only just emerging. This does not mean, however, that our research is 
condemned to be devoid of any historical context. With some forty years of foreign policy 
cooperation already, there are of course many well-established rules and habits in place. Any 
new initiatives will always, to a lesser or greater extent, be influenced by earlier institutional 
choices and trajectories. As argued by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard “life must 
be understood backwards. But… it must be lived forwards”. A good illustration of how 
continuity and change generally go hand in hand is the European External Action Service, an 
institutional innovation of the Lisbon Treaty. At first sight this new European foreign policy 
administration, comparable to a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another example of 
the EU not calling a spade a spade, seems revolutionary. When taking into account the longer-
term perspective, however, this new development appears just another step in an incremental 
process whereby the locus of decisions has gradually been shifting from the national capitals 
to Brussels. Different foreign policy actors who, up to now, have been scattered in national 
foreign ministries, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, and who have had 
to cope with the resulting problems of coordination will finally be brought together in one 
location under the authority of the High Representative. Although the new Treaty has not yet 
entered into force, the political and academic discussions surrounding the shape of this new 
body have been underway for quite a while. It is very clear from these debates that the new 
service will not seek to do away completely with past traditions but, on the contrary, will be a 
carefully built compromise striving to overcome some of the previous deficiencies, while at 
the same time building on – and respecting – the legacy of the past.  
Earlier in my presentation I pointed out the importance of information and expertise as 
a key resource of policy-making, which empowers civil servants in their relation with their 
political masters. Foreign policy is no exception. It is essential for politicians to dispose over 
accurate and timely information about international developments when choosing between 
different policy options. Traditionally the task of gathering and processing information is 
performed by diplomats in the ministries of foreign affairs, supported by diplomatic missions 
and secret intelligence services. In the sensitive field of foreign policy, information sharing 
amongst countries has been the exception rather than the rule and has occurred mostly on an 
ad hoc basis. The foreign policy cooperation amongst the Member States of the European 
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Communities from 1970 onwards constituted an interesting break with the past: firstly,  the 
exchange of information took place in a multilateral rather than in a bilateral context and, 
secondly, it was relatively institutionalised. Back in 1973, the Member States had already 
created an electronic communication network called COREU (Correspondence européenne) 
allowing the ministries of foreign affairs and the European Commission to exchange several 
thousand coded messages per year. What was communicated was, however, entirely 
determined by the individual Member States and by the political events of the time. There 
were no European-level institutions with autonomous capacities for information-gathering and 
processing. 
Once the European Union started to engage in civilian and military crisis management 
and the need for rapid and first-rate information became more urgent, this dependence on the 
Member States and the Presidency started to pose problems. Gradually, several of the units in 
the Brussels-based Council Secretariat started to play a role in analysing information. For the 
delivery of the data, the Council Secretariat continued, however, to depend to a large extent 
on what the national capitals are willing to share. It is therefore not surprising that slowly but 
gradually they start to engage in information-gathering as well. Before the previously 
mentioned joint operation in Kosovo, for instance, there was a fact-finding mission there, 
composed of staff based at the Council Secretariat who reported to the Member States via 
Solana. This process is ongoing today as the civilian operation proceeds. 
The gradual development of an institutionalised form of information-sharing and, 
increasingly, information-gathering and analysis is not only interesting because it is quite 
unique in the world of diplomacy, but also because it raises the question of influence which I 
mentioned before. What are the implications for European foreign policy if the contributions 
of big countries such as France and the UK are consistently more important than those of 
smaller Member States? Can we expect small players with specific expertise such as the  
Dutch, with their knowledge of Indonesia, or the Swedes through their experience with peace-
keeping, to ever be able to punch above their weight? What does the increasingly important 
role of Brussels-based diplomats mean for the content of European foreign policy? These are 
all questions that so far have not been addressed in the academic debate, but which can help 
us better understand the underlying power structures in the emerging European foreign policy.  
As a researcher one always runs the risk of digging deeper and deeper. But one has to 
be cautious not to be carried away by one’s own research topic. It is important to link our 
findings about the European diplomatic bureaucracies to the broader question of the EU as an 
external actor. What does the study of national and EU level diplomats teach us about the 
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Union’s role in international affairs? As a support mechanism for the foreign ministers, 
diplomatic bureaucracies are an important link in the external governance puzzle, but they are 
not the quintessential, all-important element. Foreign policy remains highly political, and 
whether or not the Member States manage to speak with one voice is not only a question of a 
well-functioning and effective diplomacy. As we have seen with the war in Iraq, the parallel 
paths of European and national foreign policy do not always converge and in very sensitive 
matters the national interest more often than not still has the final word. A second caveat is 
that, at least for the moment, Europe’s economic weight continues to be much bigger than its 
political power. Any vital study of European foreign policy should therefore also pay 
attention to the interaction with the other dimensions of EU external relations, in particular the 
Common Commercial Policy.     
 
5. Beyond Weber and Straight Cucumbers 
 
It has been quite a long road from Weber to the re-appearance of curved cucumbers on 
European markets and I realise very well that many of you associate bureaucrats with grey 
rather than green. However, I hope that I have managed to convey to you how bureaucratic 
organisations, despite their notorious rigidity, have simply been incapable of remaining 
immune to the impact of broader trends, such as globalisation and the development of a 
knowledge society. 
National civil servants spend more and more time interacting, socialising, agreeing 
and disagreeing, in regional and international fora. At the same time, supranational and 
international administrations play an increasingly important role in the process of policy-
making, directly impacting upon the life of ordinary citizens. The bureaucratic architecture of 
these organisations has, however, received little attention in the academic literature and it is 
clear that long-standing Weberian arguments about bureaucracies need to be updated. 
Through my special chair and the establishment of a research programme focusing on a 
number of specific but sufficiently broadly-defined research questions, I hope, in interaction 
with my colleagues, to unlock the ‘black box’ of international bureaucracies and to contribute 
to putting Maastricht definitively on the international Administrative Governance map. 
 
 
Dankwoord 
 
